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Policymakers often argue that increasing access to health care is one crucial avenue for decreasing
gender inequality in the developing world. Although this is generally true in the cross section, time
series evidence does not always point to the same conclusion. This paper analyzes the relationship
between access to child health investments and gender inequality in those health investments in India.
A simple theory of gender-biased parental investment suggests that gender inequality may actually
be non-monotonically related to access to health investments. At low levels of availability, investment
in girls and boys is low but equal; as availability increases, boys get investments first, creating inequality.
As availability increases further, girls also receive investments and equality is restored.  I test this
theory using data on the relationship between gender balance in vaccinations and the availability of
"Health Camps" in India.  I find support for a non-monotonic relationship. This result may shed light
on the contrast between the cross-sectional and time-series evidence on gender and development, and
may provide guidance for health policy in developing countries.
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eoster@post.harvard.eduReport focused on equity, with gender equity as a central issue (World Bank, 2006). Further,
decreases in the female-male sex ratio (number of women divided by number of men) over
time in India, South Korea, China and elsewhere – whether due to sex-selective abortion or
other changes – have raised concerns about the consequences of this trend for societies
(Hudson and den Boer (2004)).
Policy makers have argued that increasing the level of development is one of the key
factors in ameliorating gender inequality. In 2001, a World Bank report on gender and
development begins with the statement that poverty and gender inequality are closely linked:
“Large gender disparities in basic human rights, in resources and economic opportunity ... are
pervasive around the world ... And these disparities are inextricably linked to poverty,”
(World Bank, 2001). One of the aspects of development cited as crucial to aﬀecting gender
inequality is access to health services (World Bank, 1991; Hill and Upchurch, 1995). It has
been argued that increasing the level of health care will beneﬁt women and reduce gender
inequality (Grown, Gupta and Pande, 2005), although the link between development and
inequality is not limited to health (see, for example, Duﬂo, 2005). This argument is
particularly salient in India, where poverty is often linked to gender ratios by region and, by
extension, to excess female mortality (World Bank, 1991; Chatterjee, 1990).
These conclusions are largely motivated by the cross-country relationship between
gender inequality and development: gender inequality is highest in poor countries. The
poverty-inequality relationship is not, however, always supported in the time-series data.
Figure 1, for example, shows the female-male sex ratio (number of women in the population
divided by number of men) in India over the twentieth century. Although India has had a
dramatic increase in income over this period, the population has become increasingly
male-dominated.1 In this paper I think carefully about the relationship between access and
inequality and argue that, both in theory and in fact, improvements in health inputs may
have ambiguous eﬀects on gender inequality.
In this paper I focus on the case of India, and explore the relationship between gender
inequality and access to health investments in that country. I begin in Section 2 by presenting
1This pattern is even more surprising when we consider that as life expectancy overall increases we would
generally expect the sex ratio to increase since women tend to live longer.
2a simple model of gender-biased parental investment in which parents choose whether or not
to invest in health care for their children. The model assumes that this care is costly, but has
positive eﬀects on survival. The model suggests that the eﬀect of access to health care on
gender inequality is non-monotonic. In particular, starting from a situation with little access
(equivalently, high costs), increases in access will increase inequality. Continued increases in
access, however, will eventually reduce inequality. Intuitively, when health care is ﬁrst made
available (but is expensive) the most valuable children – i.e., boys – will get access to it ﬁrst.
This means that there is some range of increasing access where more boys are getting health
care while there is no change for girls, making the gender imbalance worse. Further
improvements in access, however, will lead to a decrease in the gender imbalance as the
society moves to a situation in which all children are given the same care.2
I test this prediction in the context of vaccinations. I argue in Oster (2006) that
excess female mortality in childhood is by far the most important driver of the overall gender
imbalance in India.3 The results in that paper also suggest that gender diﬀerences in
vaccination are an important factor in explaining excess female mortality in childhood,
explaining somewhere between 20 percent and 30 percent of the mortality diﬀerences. Taken
together, these facts suggest that gender diﬀerences in child vaccination rates may drive up to
a quarter of the total population gender imbalance in India. Understanding which policies
might aﬀect vaccination rates may go a long way toward changing overall gender imbalances
in survival in India.4
The primary test of the theoretical prediction relies on variation in the availability of
“Health Camps” in Indian villages. The availability of these camps increases access to
2There are interesting parallels between this theoretical result and an older literature on wealth and in-
trahousehold inequality. Kanbur and Haddad (1994), for example, argue that an intrahousehold bargaining
framework can predict this type of non-monotonic relationship between wealth and inequality within the house-
hold.
3This is distinct from diﬀerences in mortality in adulthood or diﬀerences that arise prior to birth. The latter
category would include hepatitis B, which I have argued elsewhere (Oster, 2005) is responsible for around 20
percent of the (historical) gender imbalance in India, as parents who are carriers of the hepatitis B virus are
more likely to have male children.
4This issue of proximate causes of excess female mortality is distinct from a large literature on underlying
causes of gender inequality – female education, labor force participation, etc (see, for example, Rosenzweig and
Shultz, 1982; Agnihotri, 2000; Agnihotri et al., 2002; Murthi et al., 1995; Rahman and Rao, 2004). However,
it is related to a smaller but still substantial literature on the proximate causes of mortality (Das Gupta, 1987;
Basu, 1989; Griﬃths et al., 2000; Borooah, 2004; Pande, 2003; Mishra et al., 2004). That literature argues for
many diﬀerent proximate causes (health care, nutrition) of which vaccination rates are one.
3vaccination. I argue that the placement of these camps is unrelated to existing vaccination
conditions, income, education, or average number of children. Consistent with institutional
details, camp concentration does vary by state, as well as with village population and distance
to health clinics. These are observable variations, which can ( and will) be controlled for
extensively.
Section 4 presents evidence that, consistent with the theory, initial increases in the
number of camps increase the gender imbalance in vaccination, but that further increases
decrease the imbalance. As further support for the theory, I ﬁnd that this non-monotonic
eﬀect is stronger for families with a stronger reported gender bias and somewhat stronger in
areas where other sources of vaccination are further away. In Section 5, I discuss two
alternative tests of the non-monotonic prediction, relying on information on distance to other
vaccination sources and regional-level variation in vaccination levels.
In the ﬁnal section of the paper, I consider whether this non-monotonicity is reﬂected
in changes in mortality over time. I ﬁrst use retrospective information on child mortality from
the microdata to construct a short panel of child mortality over the period from 1982-1993.
Consistent with the theory, excess female mortality increases over this period in areas where
initial vaccination levels are low. However, during the same period, excess female mortality
decreases in areas with initially high levels of vaccination. I then explore whether there is any
evidence for this non-monotonicity in mortality diﬀerences over a longer period of time in
India. Using data on life expectancy by gender in India for the last one hundred years, I show
that while average life expectancy increases, women initially lose years relative to men and
then rebound. It is obvious that this type of non-monotonicity is not driven by vaccinations
alone, suggesting that non-monotonicities in other investments may have inﬂuenced changes
in the sex ratio over time.
The results in this paper may be informative about policy. In particular, the results
suggest that how vaccinations (and possibly other health inputs) are introduced to developing
areas may be meaningful. A program that puts two vaccination camps in every village may
have a similar overall eﬀect as one that puts four camps in half of the villages, but the impact
on gender inequality is likely to be quite diﬀerent. Ultimately, the policy choice depends on
whether we are concerned only about overall mortality or whether the gender imbalance is a
4direct input to the social utility function.
2 Theory of Parental Investment
This section analyzes a simple model of gender-biased parental investments in children. The
question of interest here is how increases in access to health investments will aﬀect the gender
equality in those same investments. The later empirical work in this paper will focus on a
particular investment, vaccination, which is discrete. The theory also focuses on discrete
investments.
Families have either a male or a female child, with measure 1 of each type of family.
There is a unitary family utility function, which is separable over money and children. The
utility of a girl is φg and of a boy is φb. In this model, boys are preferred, so φb > φg.5 For
simplicity, I will assume that utility of income is linear. The overall utility function for each
family type is therefore:
Ug = Y + φg
Ub = Y + φb
Parents have an opportunity to invest in a health input for their children. Without this
input, a child will live with probability p. With the input, they live with probability ˆ p > p.
The cost of this health input for family i is v + εi, where ε ∼ N (0,σ2). For ease of
explication, I focus on the special case of normally distributed costs. However, the central
conclusion holds true for a wider set of distributions. In Appendix A, I discuss general results.
The health input will be chosen for boys and girls, respectively, if the following
inequalities hold.
φb (ˆ p − p) − v > εi
φg (ˆ p − p) − v > εi
5The assumption of one child families is obviously a simpliﬁcation. However, it is not crucial. In an earlier
version of this paper (available from the author), I developed a version of the model in which families were
endowed with existing boy and girl children. In that model, I ﬁnd that discrimination against girls is predicted
to decrease with the number of existing male children and increase with the number of existing female children.
However, the results on access (below) hold as long as, on average, boys are preferred to girls. Note that this
can hold even if the only reason girls are discriminated against is that they are in larger families.
5The share of boys invested in is, therefore, F (φb (ˆ p − p) − v) and the share of girls is
F (φg (ˆ p − p) − v), where F(.) is distributed normally. The gender inequality in investment is
measured by the diﬀerence in these shares: F (φb (ˆ p − p) − v) − F (φg (ˆ p − p) − v). The
analysis focuses on the change in this quantity as v changes.6
Denote the gender diﬀerence Θ. Under the assumption of normally distributed costs,

































The sign of this diﬀerential, however, changes based on v. The result is summarized in
Proposition 1.
Proposition 1. When investment costs are high on average, decreases in the cost result in
increased pro-male bias. As average investment costs decrease, the sign of this eﬀect switches
and further decreases result in decreases in gender bias.
Proof. The proposition claims that dD
dv is negative for high v and positive for low v and moves
from negative to positive as v decreases. To prove, I show a suﬃcient set of conditions:
dD
dv > 0 when v = 0, dD
dv < 0 when v = ∞, and dD
dv is decreasing everywhere as v increases. To
show this, note that the derivative suggests that dD
dv < 0 when
(φb (ˆ p − p) − v)
2 − (φg (ˆ p − p) − v)
2 < 0. When v = 0, (φb (ˆ p − p))
2 − (φg (ˆ p − p))
2 > 0, so
dD
dv > 0. When v = ∞, the diﬀerence is negative, so dD
dv < 0. Diﬀerentiating with respect to
v, we ﬁnd that the object is decreasing when −2φb + 2φg < 0, which will hold everywhere
since φb > φg.
The proposition suggests that, beginning in a situation with very high investment
costs (hence, limited investments), increases in access will make gender inequality worse.
Further increases, however, are predicted to decrease gender inequality.
To see the graphical intuition behind the result, consider Figure 2. This ﬁgure
graphs two possible cost distributions with diﬀerent levels of v; the dotted line represents a
6To see why this is the quantity of interest, consider that the overall sex ratio (given equal shares of boys
and girls born) is equal to
p+(ˆ p−p)F(φb(ˆ p−p)−v)
p+(ˆ p−p)F(φg(ˆ p−p)−v). As Fb − Fg increases, this will increase; as it decreases, this
will decrease. The diﬀerence between the two therefore maps into the ultimate object of interest, which is the
sex ratio.
6distribution with better access to the health investment (lower v). The cutoﬀs W1,M1 and
W2,M2 represent two sets of investment cutoﬀs (Wx is the cutoﬀ for women, Mx for men).
The mass of the distribution under the cutoﬀ receives the investment, so the W1,M1 cutoﬀs
represent a world with overall higher investment levels. Consider what happens to the gender
diﬀerence in investments when we move from the solid to the dotted distribution, which
represents a decrease in v. For the case of W2,M2, this movement causes a greater increase in
the share receiving the investment for men than for women because both lines are on the
increasing part of the distribution. In contrast for the case of W1,M1, the increase causes a
greater improvement for women because both lines are on the decreasing part of the
distribution. It is this intuition that is central to the result.
In Appendix A, I discuss the generality of this result. Although it will not be true
for all cost distributions, the intuition in Figure 2 is robust. In particular, the fact that dD
dv is
negative at high values of v and positive at low values will be true in general for any single
peaked distributions (although it will hold for other distributions, as well). If we take this
framework seriously, it suggests that improvements in access to health care are not always the
path to decreased gender inequality, at least in the short run.
3 Data
The analysis here is run using individual-level microdata on child health investments in India.
I use primarily the second wave of the National Family and Health Survey (NFHS), which
covers approximately 90,000 women and was run in 1998-1999. Women are asked about their
birth history, including children ever born, dates of birth, if the children are alive, and, if not,
when they died. In addition, for children under four, information is collected on vaccination
and other health inputs. I will also make some use of the earlier wave of the NFHS, which was
run on a similar sample size in 1992-1993.
The primary child investment analyzed here is vaccination. There are seven possible
vaccinations: three DPT (diphtheria, pertussis, and tetanus) vaccines, two polio vaccines, a
measles vaccine, and a BCG (tuberculosis) vaccine. The measure of vaccination is simply the
total number of vaccinations reported on the child’s health card. The results are extremely
7similar if I consider the determinants of each vaccination separately.
The analysis will also use information on the number of “Family Health and Welfare
Camps” held in each village in the previous year, as well as information on distance to other
sources of vaccination. The information on camps is drawn from the NFHS village survey
(administered to the village head). The information on distance is household-speciﬁc and
comes from the NFHS household survey.
4 Health Camps and Gender Diﬀerences in Vaccination
This section describes the primary test of the theory in this paper, which relies on variation in
the availability of vaccination camps across villages. In the ﬁrst subsection I discuss the
placement of vaccination camps. The second subsection presents results.
4.1 Placement of Health Camps
Beginning in the mid-1990s, the National Health and Welfare Ministry in India began a new
phase of the overall campaign to bring better health care to India – the Reproductive and
Child Health Programme (RCH) (Indian Ministry of Health and Family Welfare, 1998). One
of the primary elements of this campaign is greater outreach remote and poorly served areas.
This outreach comes primarily in the form of establishing Primary Health Centers (PHC) and
Community Health Centers (CHC) to serve relatively small population areas. These centers,
in turn, can run RCH camps, either in their own location or in even more remote areas. In
contrast to the PHC and CHC, these camps are mobile and temporary, usually lasting only
one or two days, and oﬀer only very basic health services (for a general discussion of these
camps, see Mavalankar and Sinha, 1999).
There appears to be no systematic scheme for camp placement. The RCH programme
is run at the state level, suggesting that there may well be variations across states in the
number of camps. In addition, since the camps were based out of PHCs and CHCs and travel
is expensive, we may expect areas closer to these clinics to have more camps. Finally, village
population may also have a role, since the beneﬁt of a camp is likely to be larger in bigger
villages. Given these concerns, all regressions will allow for the eﬀect of gender to diﬀer
8between states and in interaction with village population and distance to these other sources
of health care.
However, it is also important to consider whether empirical placement of the camps
appears to be non-random beyond these controls. For example, are there more camps in
richer or more well-educated areas, or areas with more children? To test for this, in Table 1, I
regress the number of camps by village on some simple village characteristics (income,
maternal education and age, village population, and ideal sex ratio) from the 1998 survey.7
In the ﬁrst column, I simply show the regression on village size, distance to another
source, and state ﬁxed eﬀects (the coeﬃcients on state are not shown, but the test that they
are all equal is reported). As suspected, all three of these parameters matter – there are more
camps in larger villages and in those villages closer to a PHC or CHC. In addition, we can
reject the equality of the coeﬃcients for each state with high conﬁdence. Column 2 of Table 1
includes a set of additional demographic controls. None of these additional controls are
signiﬁcant; placement does not seem to be related to education, income, age, religion, or
number of children. This is also true if we do not condition on state, population, and distance
(results available from the author).
A more speciﬁc concern is that camp placement might be correlated with initial
vaccination conditions. However, it is not possible to examine this possibility using the 1998
data since we expect causality to run the other way (more camps imply more vaccination). To
test for a relationship between vaccination camp placement and pre-existing gender
diﬀerentials in vaccinations, I take advantage of the 1992 wave of the survey: Table 2
estimates the relationship between the average number of camps (at the state level) and
gender diﬀerence in vaccination rates in 1992. Column 1 includes the gender diﬀerence in
vaccination and average vaccinations linearly; column 2 includes a quadratic in each. This
regression suggests no relationship between the gender diﬀerence in vaccination and camp
placement. This suggests that although there were important state-speciﬁc drivers of the
number of camps, these do not seem to be related to gender imbalances in vaccination. It
would be better to link the surveys in smaller geographic units, but the data does not provide
7In this case, and throughout this section, the number of camps is top-coded at ﬁve. Ninety-eight percent
of villages have ﬁve or fewer camps, and the top-coding avoids allowing outliers to drive the results.
9consistent links between districts over time.
This discussion should provide some conﬁdence that, although placement of these
camps is by no means completely exogenous, the primary drivers of the placement can be
observed and I control for them. It is also the case that, even if these camps were placed
endogenously (for example, targeting areas with low vaccination levels), the endogenaity
would have to be of a particular form in order to induce the non-linear results seen here.
Targeting areas with low vaccinations would not produce these results. Targeted camp
placement could drive the results only if areas with high male preference were targeted to
receive a few camps, while areas with low male preference were targeted to receive either no
camps or many camps. Although it is obviously not possible to rule this out, it would seem
like a relatively unusual circumstance.
4.2 Results on Camps and Gender Inequality
The central question in this section is how the gender imbalance in vaccination is related to
the number of health camps. The basic result can be seen in Figure 3, which reports the
gender diﬀerence in average number of vaccinations for children six months to two years,
graphed against the number of vaccination camps in the previous year, as well as the average
number of vaccinations for each gender.8 The ﬁgure points to a non-monotonic relationship.
Moving from zero or one camp to two camps causes a large increase in the gender diﬀerence.
This increase continues up to three camps, after which girls begin to gain again. The
maximum gender diﬀerence is at three camps, and the gender diﬀerence is similar at zero or
one camp, and at ﬁve or more. Of course, the average number of vaccinations is generally
increasing for both boys and girls as the number of camps increase, so children are, on
average, better oﬀ in areas with four or ﬁve camps than areas with none.
Table 3 explores the relationship in a regression context with controls. I control for
standard demographics and family characteristics. In addition, all regressions include state
ﬁxed eﬀects and interactions between state and gender dummies, as well as interactions
between gender and quadratics of both village population and distance to the nearest PHC or
8I restrict to children in this age group since they are the ones who would have needed vaccinations in the
previous year. Consistent with this, the results are less strong for older children.
10CHC. All standard errors are clustered at the village level. Column 1 assumes that the
relationship between vaccination camps and gender imbalance is quadratic and estimates the
coeﬃcient on the interaction between girl and number of camps and the interaction between
girl and the number of camps squared (as before, the number of camps is top-coded at ﬁve).
The coeﬃcient estimates do point to a non-monotonic relationship. The linear interaction
term is negative (increases in vaccination camps increase discrimination), but the squared
term is positive. The magnitudes suggest that the eﬀect is zero around 4.2 vaccination camps
per year.
In Columns 2 and 3 of Table 3, I consider an alternative to the assumption of a
quadratic functional form. I estimate the regression separately for areas with few camps and
areas with many. Column 2 estimates the eﬀect of vaccination camps in areas with fewer than
three camps, and Column 3 estimates the eﬀects in areas with more than three camps. The
results are consistent with Column 1. In areas with limited vaccination camps, increases seem
to make girls worse oﬀ relative to boys. In areas with more camps, increases improve the
relative position of girls.9 Interestingly, the (relative) negative eﬀect of initially increasing
access is more signiﬁcant than the (relative) positive eﬀect of further increases. This may
reﬂect the much smaller sample size, but it could also suggest that the catch-up eﬀect is more
limited, particularly at the number of camps we are considering here.
Despite the evidence in the previous subsection that the placement of camps is
unrelated to village-level socioeconomic status, there may still be concerns about these issues.
Column 4 of Table 3 therefore replicates Column 1 but also includes controls for the
interaction between gender and income, gender and income squared, and gender and
education (linear and squared), as well as the existing controls for gender interactions with
village population and distance. If the result on vaccination camps is being driven by some
non-linear interaction of gender and another control, this speciﬁcation should identify it. In
fact, the coeﬃcients in Column 4 are extremely similar to Column 1, suggesting that these
issues are not responsible for the results.
9The magnitude of the interaction, relative to the level eﬀect of camps, would suggest that initial increases in
vaccination camps actually make girls worse oﬀ in an absolute sense, which is not consistent with the pattern in
Figure 4. This is due to the inclusion of state ﬁxed eﬀects and the gender interaction with state; these inclusions
make the level eﬀect of camps impossible to interpret.
11One of the assumptions underlying the theoretical framework is that boys are
preferred to girls. This assumption, however, provides an additional prediction – namely, the
non-linear eﬀect should be stronger for people who have a stronger preference for male
children. To test this, I divide the sample based on each woman’s reported ideal sex ratio and
replicate the regression in Column 1 of Table 3 for each half of the sample. The hypothesis is
that the non-linearity should be stronger for the set of women who report wanting a greater
ratio of boys to girls.10 I deﬁne women as having a preference for boys if they report wanting
more boys than girls; the alternative is desiring equal numbers or more girls.
These regressions are shown in Columns 1 and 2 of Table 4. Column 1 includes
women who do not want a male-biased sex ratio among children; Column 2 includes those
who do. The results are consistent with the theory. In Column 1, neither of the two
interactions between gender and camps is signiﬁcant. In Column 2, however, the interactions
are signiﬁcant and much larger. The contrast suggests that, as predicted, this relationship
holds more consistently for families with more gender-biased preferences. In Columns 3 and 4
of Table 4, I replicate this analysis but divide families based on the average desired gender
composition in their area (primary sampling unit). This is, perhaps, a weaker test than the
one using individual preferences. However, it does avoid the issue that parental gender
preferences may be related to the gender of their existing children. The results in Columns 3
and 4 look very similar to those in Columns 1 and 2. In areas with limited male-biased
preferences, neither coeﬃcient is signiﬁcant, whereas in areas with stronger male-biased
preferences, both coeﬃcients are signiﬁcant.
A second sample split-based test of the theory relies on the observation that
vaccination camps are not the only way children get vaccinated. The non-monotonicity should
therefore be stronger in areas where vaccination camps are more important. In the NFHS,
women who have a young child are asked where most of the child’s vaccinations of the child
took place. The majority of women report either a Primary Health Center (PHC), a
Community Health Center (CHC), or a Government Hospital. For women with easy access to
10Obviously, reported ideal number of male and female children is not a perfect measure of gender preferences.
However, it should provide some proxy. In addition, it is certainly the case that the gender inequality in
vaccination is larger for families where parents report wanting more male children (results available from the
author).
12these sources, it seems likely that vaccination camps will be less important.
This analysis is complicated somewhat by the fact that, as noted, camps are more
likely in villages where a PHC or CHC is located. This means that it may be the case that
people who live in a village with one of these sources are more likely to rely on camps than
people who live just outside of them. Although the comparison of people who live near the
source versus far is still valid, this may dampen the results. I divide the sample into three
groups based on distance to the closest PHC, CHC, or Government Hospital – less than ﬁve
km away, ﬁve-ten km away, and more than ten km away. The regression results are shown in
Table 5. Consistent with the importance of camps, the non-monotonicity is strongest in areas
that are more than 10 km away. Although the coeﬃcients in Columns 1 and 2 are not
signiﬁcant, the coeﬃcients in Column 1 (for areas very close to a PHC, CHC, or hospital) are
slightly larger. This may be driven by the relationship between distance and camps.
Both Tables 4 and 5 bolster the conclusions in Table 3. The eﬀect of vaccination
camps is largest for families with limited access to other sources of vaccination and for those
with stronger male-biased preferences. Another obvious test would be to explore whether the
inequality-access relationship holds less strongly for families where there are two children of
opposite gender close in age. Intuitively, in families where a female child needs vaccination at
the same time as a male child, the relationship between access and inequality may be muted.
Unfortunately, the sample sizes are too limited (given the necessary closeness in age – a year
or less) to test this hypothesis.
5 Other Determinants of Vaccination Access
A signiﬁcant advantage of the analysis above is that vaccination camps are likely to operate in
large part as shocks to the availability of vaccination in the village. This makes them less
obviously correlated with existing conditions and they provide a relatively clean test. In
addition, their discrete nature makes the exploration of non-monotonic eﬀects relatively
straightforward. The theoretical framework, however, is not speciﬁc to vaccination camps (or
even to vaccination). In general, we expect discrimination to be non-monotonic in any
measure of access to vaccination. This section considers two alternative proxies for access to
13vaccination and aims to demonstrate, among other things, that the results are not driven by
the use of health camps as the shifter of access.
I ﬁrst proxy for access using the reported distance from the nearest Primary Health
Center, Community Health Center, or Government Hospital, as reported in the village survey
in the 1998 NFHS. Approximately 50 percent of women report this as their source of
immunization, so it seems to be a good proxy for access. Of course, access to these centers has
other implications and may be correlated with unobservables. However, there is no obviously
apparent bias that would produce a non-monotonic relationship in gender imbalance.
Table 6 shows the relationship between total vaccinations and gender, interacted with
both distance and distance squared. In this case, the theory would predict the interaction
with distance to be negative and with distance squared to be positive.11 A sizable fraction of
people report having a health facility in their village. These are coded as zero distance,
although this may not be strictly correct.
In Column 1 of Table 6, I show the regression with all observations; in Column 2, I
restrict to people who report a non-zero distance to avoid any issues with the in-village
measure. The coeﬃcients have the expected sign and are at least marginally signiﬁcant in
both columns. If anything, the results are stronger in Column 2, when I leave out people who
report having a health facility in their village. The relationship switches sign at a distance of
around 30 km. Columns 3 and 4 of Table 6 split the entire sample based on gender
preferences (as was done in Table 4). Column 3 shows the regression for women who report
wanting more girls or wanting equality; Column 4 shows the regression for women who report
wanting more boys. Again, as expected, the results are much stronger for those with a
male-biased preference.
As a second test, I consider the cross-regional relationship between the level of
vaccination and the gender diﬀerence in vaccination. In this case, the level of vaccination is
the proxy for vaccination access. Even more than the analysis with Primary and Community
Health Centers, this is subject to bias. However, it does provide the only opportunity to
consider this relationship outside of rural villages.
11These predicted interactions have the opposite sign from the interactions on number of camps because
increases in the number of camps imply increases in access and increases in distance imply decreases in access.
14I take advantage of the cluster design of the NFHS (a cluster, in this case, is a
collection of on average 750 households in the same area). I aggregate the data to the cluster
level and calculate the average number of vaccinations and the diﬀerence between this average
for boys and girls. The primary regression will consider the shape of the relationship between
the level and the diﬀerence. The results are shown in Table 7, where the dependent variable is
the gender diﬀerence in average number of vaccines received; Column 1 considers a monotonic
relationship between the level and the diﬀerence, and Column 2 considers a non-monotonic
relationship. The results seem consistent with a nonlinear relationship; the coeﬃcient in
Column 1 is small, and not signiﬁcant. In Column 2, however, both the average and the
average squared are signiﬁcant and have the expected sign. The number of vaccinations
ranges from zero to seven. The magnitude of the coeﬃcients suggests that the gender
imbalance is increasing up to an average of ﬁve vaccinations and decreasing thereafter.12
6 Non-Monotonicities in Mortality over Time
The evidence in the previous two sections focuses on vaccination directly. However, the
theoretical framework is not speciﬁc to vaccinations, or even to childhood illnesses. If the
theory holds true more broadly, that would suggest non-monotonicities in movements in
mortality over time. In this section, I consider some evidence on changes in mortality over
time. This evidence is much more preliminary and speculative than the evidence on
vaccinations. The ﬁrst subsection discusses mortality among children; the second takes a
broader view and considers overall life expectancy in India over time.
6.1 Childhood Mortality, 1982-1993
Given the focus on child health investments above, it seems reasonable to ﬁrst consider
non-monotonic changes in gender inequality in childhood mortality. Ideally, we would like to
have a relatively long time-series in which child mortality by gender is observed. These type
12This result is in contrast to the results in Pande and Yazbeck (2003), who argue that gender diﬀerences
in immunization across states do not seem to be related to levels. This may underscore the importance of
considering the regional relationship at a less aggregated level.
15of data are not generally available. It is possible, however, to create a short time series using
retrospective reports on child mortality in the two survey waves of the NFHS.
I consider the mortality outcomes for children born between ﬁve and ten years before
each survey year (1992 and 1998). This eﬀectively creates a time series of child death rates
from 1982 through 1993. The outcome of interest is mortality between 18 months and ﬁve
years. I do not consider very early life mortality, since it will be generally unaﬀected by
investments like vaccinations. In addition, I limit to children under the age of ten to avoid (as
much as possible) the chance that mothers have forgotten to list children who were born
many years ago and died early in life.
The ideal analysis would look at the existence of non-monotonic changes in the
gender balance of mortality over time within a particular area. Unfortunately, with such a
short time series, there are no areas that have gone through a suﬃciently large change.
Instead, I consider whether the change in the gender imbalance in mortality over this short
period is diﬀerent in regions with diﬀerent initial levels of vaccination.
Using information on average number of vaccinations by state in 1992 and 1998
surveys, I ﬁrst restrict the analysis to states in which there was an increase of at least 0.1
vaccinations between the two survey years.13 I then divide the remaining states into two
groups based on their initial level of vaccination and using information from Figure 3 on the
level of vaccination at which the relationship ﬂips sign. There are relatively few areas with
many vaccinations, and I restrict this group to states where the average number of
vaccinations by 1998 is at least three (Tripura, Jammu, Himachal Pradesh, Kerala, and
Goa).14 All remaining states are assigned to the other group. Recall that the theory would
suggest increases in relative female mortality in areas with initially low vaccinations and
decreases in areas with initially high levels.
The results from the regressions for the two groups are shown in Table 8. Column 1
13This eliminates Rajasthan, Bihar, Uttar Pradesh, Haryana, Gujarat, Arunachal Pradesh, Assam, New
Delhi, and Mizoram.
14The evidence from Figure 3 would suggest that the cutoﬀ is higher than this. However, what we observe
in Figure 3 is the average vaccination level after the vaccination clinics. Presumably the vaccination level was
lower before, making three a reasonable cutoﬀ. In addition, because this is done at the state level (due to
the fact that I cannot link smaller areas in the data over time), there are virtually no states with very high
levels of vaccination. It is worth noting that these issues will only make it more diﬃcult to ﬁnd evidence of
non-monotonicities.
16shows the regression in the low initial vaccination group and Column 2 in the high vaccination
group. The coeﬃcient of interest is on the interaction between girl and date of birth. The
dependent variable is an indicator for having died between 18 months and ﬁve years, so the
theory suggests a positive coeﬃcient in Column 1 and a negative coeﬃcient in Column 2. In
addition to the simple demographic controls shown, I have included birth order dummies and
dummies for each region, as well as for these regional dummies interacted with gender. This
controls for the possibility that low (or high) levels of vaccination are correlated with overall
levels of gender discrimination.
The results in Table 8 are supportive of the theory. In Column 1, the coeﬃcient on
the interaction is positive. The magnitude suggests that during the ten-year period
considered, female mortality in these regions increased relative to male mortality by 0.74
percentage points. In contrast, the coeﬃcient in Column 2 is negative. During the same
ten-year period, female mortality in those regions decreased relative to male mortality by 0.96
percentage points. These are both quite large eﬀects since the average mortality in this age
range is around 3 percent.
6.2 Life Expectancy in India, 1870-2000
Given the eﬀects on child mortality, it is interesting to consider whether it is possible to see
these non-monotonicities in wider data – in particular, in data on life expectancy in India over
the previous century. This moves away from the earlier analysis in two respects. First, life
expectancy and child mortality are not identical, although they are be closely linked, since a
major component of increases in life expectancy from initially low levels is decreases in infant
mortality. Second, the issue of vaccinations is important later in the century, but not in the
early part. The analysis here looks for a more general correlation between level of health
investments and the gender diﬀerence in mortality. Evidence for such a relationship might
suggest that there are non-monotonicities across genders in other health investments.
The Indian Census (formerly the British Census of India) reports life expectancy for
men and women over the period from 1871 to the present. Using these data, it is possible to
construct time series of the average life expectancy and the diﬀerence between genders in life
expectancy for this relatively long period. These series are graphed in Figure 4. In these data,
17particularly after 1910, we see evidence of a U-shaped relationship in the diﬀerence,
accompanied by an overall increase in the average (the general pattern of changes for men and
women over the century is very similar). In the 1910-1920 period, female life expectancy
exceeds that of men by around 1.5 years, although the average is very low, at around 20. By
the 1960-1970 period, female life expectancy is actually 1.5 years less than that of men, but
the average has increased to around 45. Women seem to rebound by the end of the period.
Women in 1980-1990 have a life expectancy about 1 year greater than men, and the average
has climbed to almost 60 years.
This may shed some light on overall changes in the sex ratio in India over the
previous one hundred years. It is well known that population female-male sex ratios (the ratio
of women to men in the population) have been falling over time. This is consistent with
increases in discrimination, but it is also potentially consistent with a constant level of
discrimination and the non-monotonic eﬀect discussed above. The evidence on life expectancy
in Figure 4 would suggest that, if this is true, the sex ratio in the population should not
continue to decline, but should rebound toward the end of the century.15 Interestingly, as can
be seen in Figure 1, we do see some evidence of a potential rebound, or at least a ﬂattening of
the trend after 1970, and some increase between 1990 and 2000. The timing is similar to the
trend in life expectancies.
The drop in sex ratio over time has caused signiﬁcant policy concern (Mayer, 1999).
The graphs here may not demonstrate that changes over time are necessarily related to
non-monotonic changes in the gender imbalance in health investments. However, taken
together with the evidence on vaccinations, the connection is suggestive. If true, it may lead
us to expect further changes in the patterns of mortality over time, with sex ratios trending
back toward a situation where the imbalance is similar to what it was at the start of the
century, but the level of mortality is much lower.
15This ignores the introduction of sex-selective abortion, which has become increasingly important recently
(see Jha et al., 2006).
187 Conclusion
There has been much policy focus, particularly in India, on increasing access to health
services as a means of decreasing gender inequality. This paper explores the evidence
supporting such interventions. I argue that increasing access to vaccination is an obvious
intervention of this type, since vaccination is an important input to child health. However,
both theory and evidence indicate that the eﬀects of increases in access to vaccinations are
not clear. At low levels of immunization, increasing access is likely to make the gender
imbalance worse, while further increases are likely to improve the imbalance.
The analysis above is primarily positive. I focus on establishing the relationship
between vaccination availability and gender imbalance. This leads to the question of whether
there are normative conclusions to be made. Do these results suggest a particular policy
approach?
It is worth noting, ﬁrst, that technological change, in the form of sex-selective
abortion, may increasingly render this issue moot. It has been recently argued that as many
as 10 million female fetuses were aborted in the last ﬁfteen years (Jha et al., 2006). In the
limit, if use of this technology increases, it could be the case that virtually all discrimination
is moved to the period before birth. In this case, conditional on being born, there should be
limited discrimination and we should see no non-monotonic eﬀect of increases in vaccination
access. This scenario seems unlikely, in part because Indian authorities have moved to prevent
increases in the use of these technologies and in part because abortion may not be less costly
than neglect. Nevertheless, it may temper any possible policy ramiﬁcations here.
Abstracting away from recent changes, the potential policy conclusions here depend
largely on what welfare function we hope to maximize. These results suggest that increases in
access to health inputs will make everyone better oﬀ; they just make girls better oﬀ more
slowly than boys. If the primary concern is decreasing mortality, then a policy that seeks to
increase access to health investments may be optimal. If, on the other hand, the policymaker
cares independently about the sex ratio, then it may be prudent to think more carefully about
the mechanics of health interventions.
To be more concrete, the non-monotonicity would suggest that if policymakers care
19directly about the sex ratio, interventions to increase access to health inputs should focus on
saturating one area rather than introducing the inputs in a more limited way in all areas. If
we take the quantitative results in this paper seriously, it is possible to directly evaluate these
tradeoﬀs. In particular, combining the results implicit in Figure 3 with the eﬀect of
vaccination estimated elsewhere (Oster, 2006) can tell us the eﬀect of diﬀerent methods of
vaccination camp dispersion. Consider the diﬀerence between moving from zero to three
camps in all areas of the country, versus moving from zero to some kind of saturation (i.e. at
least four) in half of the regions. The calibration suggests that moving from zero to three
camps in all areas would increase survival by, on average, ten lives per 10,000 children.
However, it would increase the sex ratio by eleven for every 20,000 children. In contrast,
moving from zero to saturation in half the regions would also increase survival, on average
(including non-aﬀected areas), by ten lives per 10,000, while leaving the sex ratio unchanged.
Which of these two options to choose will depend largely on the preferences of policymakers,
or the social welfare function. If gender discrimination is paramount, then introducing many
camps into a few areas is ideal. On the other hand, if spatial or regional discrimination takes
priority, there may be an argument for equal introduction everywhere, despite the
consequences for gender ratios.
20Appendix A: General Theoretical Results
This appendix discusses the general form of the result in Section 2. As there, we note that
the conditions for vaccinations for boys and girls are
φb (ˆ p − p) − v > εi
φg (ˆ p − p) − v > εi
and that the diﬀerence of interest is F (φb (ˆ p − p) − v)−F (φg (ˆ p − p) − v). In the text I focus
on the case where F (.) is normal and show results indicating that at high v this diﬀerence
will increase with decreases in v, and at low v the diﬀerence will decrease with decreases in v.
Here, I discuss what must generally be true about the distribution for this to hold.




f (x − v)dx







0 (x − v)dx
In order for this to be negative at high v and positive at low v, we simply require that f (.) be
increasing in the left tail, and decreasing in the right tail. Any single-peaked distribution will
have this property.
In contrast to the case of the normal, where this is decreasing everywhere in v, we
will not be able to prove that generally. However, the intuition that girls become relatively
worse oﬀ with decreases in v at high v and relatively better oﬀ with decreases in v at low v
will be true for a wide class of distributions.
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23Table 1. Vaccination Camps and Current Village Characteristics












Ave Mother Educ −.0045
(−.29)
Ave. Mother Age .0144
(1.06)
Ave. # Durables .0371
(.75)
Ave. Ideal Sex Ratio .4278
(1.06)








State Fixed Eﬀects YES YES
F-Stat, State FE Equal 7.66 6.83
Number of Observations 2335 2248
R2 .19 .18
Notes: This table estimates whether there is evidence that camp placement is based
on current village characteristics. An observation is a village, and the dependent
variable is the average number of camps.
t-statistics in parentheses
∗ signiﬁcant at 10%; ∗∗ signiﬁcant at 5%; ∗∗∗ signiﬁcant at 1%
24Table 2. Camps and 1992 State Characteristics












Gender Diﬀ in Vacc, 1992, Sq. −2.0194
(−.49)
Average Vacc, 1992, Sq. −.2263
(−.82)
















Number of Observations 25 25
R2 .36 .42
Notes: The table estimates whether there is any evidence for camp placement being
based on existing gender diﬀerences in vaccination. An observation is a state and
the dependent variable is the average number of camps. The independent variable
of interest is the diﬀerence in vaccination rates across genders in that state in 1992.
t-statistics in parentheses
∗ signiﬁcant at 10%; ∗∗ signiﬁcant at 5%; ∗∗∗ signiﬁcant at 1%
25Table 3. Vaccination Camps and Gender Imbalance in Vaccination
Dependent Variable: Number of Vaccinations Child Has
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Entire Sample <3 Camps ≥ 3 Camps Sample
Explanatory
Variables:
























































State Fixed Eﬀects YES YES YES YES
State-Gender Inter. YES YES YES YES
Village Size-Gender Inter. YES YES YES YES
Distance-Gender Inter. YES YES YES YES
Gender-Control Inter. NO NO NO YES
Number of Observations 10,854 9,415 1,439 10,577
R2 .29 .29 .29 .29
Notes: This table estimates the eﬀect of vaccination camps on the gender imbalance in vac-
cination. An observation is a child aged six months to two years and the dependent variable
is the number of vaccinations the child has received (0-7). # Camps is the number of Family
Health and Welfare Camps reported in the village in the previous year – 0, 1, 2, 3, 4 or 5
or more. Column 1 includes all areas. Column 2 includes only areas where the number of
camps is 0, 1 or 2. Column 3 includes only areas in which there are three or more camps. All
columns include interactions between gender and state, as well as interactions between gender
and village population (linear and squared) and distance to closest CHC or PHC (linear and
squared). Column 4 also includes interactions between gender and income (linear and squared)
and education (linear and squared). The main eﬀect of girl is subsumed in the state-gender
interactions. Other controls: maternal age, maternal education, family durable ownership, a
dummy for being Hindu, birth order and village size.
t-statistics in parentheses, standard errors clustered at the village level
∗ signiﬁcant at 10%; ∗∗ signiﬁcant at 5%; ∗∗∗ signiﬁcant at 1%
26Table 4. Eﬀect of Vaccination Camps by Gender Preference
Dependent Variable: Number of Vaccinations Child Has
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Ideal: Ideal: Ave. Ideal: Ave Ideal:
Equal/More Girls More Boys Girls Boys
Explanatory
Variables:
































































State Fixed Eﬀects YES YES YES YES
State-Gender Inter. YES YES YES YES
Village Size-Gender Inter. YES YES YES YES
Distance-Gender Inter. YES YES YES YES
Number of Obs. 6267 4292 5761 4796
R2 .29 .24 .29 .29
Notes: This table estimates the eﬀect of vaccination camps on the gender imbalance in vaccina-
tion. An observation is a child aged six months to two years and the dependent variable is the
number of vaccinations the child has received (0-7). # Camps is the number of Family Health
and Welfare Camps reported in the village in the previous year. All columns include interac-
tions between gender and state, as well as interactions between gender and village population
(linear and squared) and distance to closest CHC or PHC (linear and squared). Column 1 in-
cludes only women who report wanting equal numbers of boys and girls or more girls; Column
2 includes women who report wanting more boys. Column 3 includes areas in the bottom 50%
in average desired boys; Column 4 includes areas in the top 50%. Other controls: maternal
age, maternal education, family income, a dummy for being Hindu, birth order, a quadratic in
child age.
t-statistics in parentheses , standard errors clustered at the village level
∗ signiﬁcant at 10%; ∗∗ signiﬁcant at 5%;∗∗∗ signiﬁcant at 1%
27Table 5. Eﬀect of Vaccination Camps by Distance to Other Source
Dependent Variable: Number of Vaccinations Child Has
(1) (2) (3)
Other Source < 5km Other 5-10 km Other >10 km
Explanatory
Variables:
















































State Fixed Eﬀects YES YES YES
State-Gender Inter. YES YES YES
Village Size-Gender Inter. YES YES YES
Number of Obs. 4998 2851 2728
R2 .29 .32 .28
Notes: This table estimates the eﬀect of vaccination camps on the gender imbalance in vac-
cination. An observation is a child aged 6 months to 2 years and the dependent variable is
the number of vaccinations the child has received (0-7). # Camps is the number of Family
Health and Welfare Camps reported in the village in the previous year. All columns include
interactions between gender and state, as well as interactions between gender and village popu-
lation (linear and squared). Column 1 includes people who report a CHC, PHC, or Government
Hospital within 5 km of their house; Column 2 includes those who report one between 5 and
10 km away and Column 3 includes those who report the nearest of these is more than 10 km
away. Other controls: maternal age, maternal education, family income, a dummy for being
Hindu, birth order, a quadratic in child age.
t-statistics in parentheses, standard errors clustered at the village level
∗ signiﬁcant at 10%; ∗∗ signiﬁcant at 5%;∗∗∗ signiﬁcant at 1%
28Table 6. Access to Health Facility and Gender Imbalance in Vaccination
Dependent Variable: Number of Vaccinations Child Has
(1) (2) (3) (4)
All Not in Village Ideal: Equal/Girls Ideal: Boys
Explanatory
Variables:
































































State Fixed Eﬀects YES YES YES YES
Village Size-Gender Inter. YES YES YES YES
Number of Obs. 14132 11228 8062 6070
R2 .27 .26 .28 .20
Notes: This table estimates the eﬀect of distance to a primary health center, a community health
center, or a government hospital on the gender imbalance in vaccination. An observation is a
child aged one to four years and the dependent variable is the number of vaccinations the child
has received (0-7). Distance is the minimum distance reported in the village survey to either
a Primary Health Center, a Community Health Center, or a Government Hospital. Column 1
includes all observations and Column 2 limits to those without one of these health facilities in
the village. Column 3 includes all villages, but only people who report wanting equal numbers
of boys and girl or more girls; Column 4 includes all villages but only those who report wanting
more boys. Other controls: maternal age, maternal education, family income, a dummy for
being Hindu, and birth order.
t-statistics in parentheses , standard errors clustered at the village level
∗ signiﬁcant at 10%; ∗∗ signiﬁcant at 5%; ∗∗∗ signiﬁcant at 1%
29Table 7. Regional Relationship Between Levels and Diﬀerence in Vaccination








Average Vacc. Sq. −.0262∗∗∗
(−2.97)




















Number of Observations 3506 3506
R2 .01 .01
Notes: This table estimates the relationship between average vaccination
level and gender diﬀerence in vaccination. An observation is a cluster in
the survey. The dependent variable is the vaccination average for boys
minus that for girls. The independent variables of interest are the average
vaccination level and that variable squared. These are intended to proxy
for the cost of these investments.
t-statistics in parentheses
∗ signiﬁcant at 10%; ∗∗ signiﬁcant at 5%; ∗∗∗ signiﬁcant at 1%
30Table 8. Changes in Gender Bias in Mortality, 1982-1992
Dependent Variable: Child Died 18 months - 5 years
(1) (2)
Low Initial Vaccination High Initial Vaccination
Explanatory
Variables:




























Number of Observations 53420 14994
Notes: This table estimates a probit model of the evolution of gender inequality in
mortality over the period from 1982 to 1993, using a created panel based on children
of diﬀerent ages. The dependent variable is an indicator for whether the child died
between 18 months and ﬁve years, conditional on having reached 18 months. The
regression is limited to children born ﬁve to ten years before the survey. Column 1
includes states with initially low vaccination levels, where we would expect increases
in gender discrimination over time. Column 2 includes states with initially high
vaccination levels where we would expect decreases over time. Other controls include
dummies for birth order and region, interacted with girl. The main eﬀect of girl is
not reported since it is captured in the eﬀect for each region.
t-statistics in parentheses
∗ signiﬁcant at 10%; ∗∗ signiﬁcant at 5%; ∗∗∗ signiﬁcant at 1%
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t
 
o
f
 
d
e
c
r
e
a
s
i
n
g
 
t
h
e
 
a
v
e
r
a
g
e
 
v
a
c
c
i
n
a
t
i
o
n
 
c
o
s
t
 
(
m
o
v
i
n
g
 
t
h
e
 
d
i
s
t
r
i
b
u
t
i
o
n
 
f
r
o
m
 
t
h
e
 
s
o
l
i
d
 
t
o
 
t
h
e
 
d
o
t
t
e
d
 
l
i
n
e
)
 
o
n
 
t
h
e
 
g
e
n
d
e
r
 
d
i
f
f
e
r
e
n
c
e
 
i
n
 
v
a
c
c
i
n
a
t
i
o
n
 
f
o
r
 
a
 
h
i
g
h
 
v
a
c
c
i
n
a
t
i
o
n
 
e
n
v
i
r
o
n
m
e
n
t
 
(
W
1
,
M
1
)
 
a
n
d
 
a
 
l
o
w
 
v
a
c
c
i
n
a
t
i
o
n
 
e
n
v
i
r
o
n
m
e
n
t
 
(
W
2
,
M
2
)
.
 
 
E
v
e
r
y
o
n
e
 
w
i
t
h
 
c
o
s
t
s
 
b
e
l
o
w
 
t
h
e
 
c
u
t
o
f
f
 
l
i
n
e
 
v
a
c
c
i
n
a
t
e
s
.
 
 
I
n
 
t
h
e
 
h
i
g
h
 
v
a
c
c
i
n
a
t
i
o
n
 
s
i
t
u
a
t
i
o
n
,
 
m
o
v
i
n
g
 
t
h
e
 
d
i
s
t
r
i
b
u
t
i
o
n
 
i
n
c
r
e
a
s
e
s
 
f
e
m
a
l
e
 
v
a
c
c
i
n
a
t
i
o
n
 
r
e
l
a
t
i
v
e
 
t
o
 
m
a
l
e
.
 
 
I
n
 
t
h
e
 
l
o
w
 
v
a
c
c
i
n
a
t
i
o
n
 
e
n
v
i
r
o
n
m
e
n
t
,
 
t
h
e
 
c
o
n
v
e
r
s
e
 
i
s
 
t
r
u
e
.
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3
:
 
V
a
c
c
i
n
a
t
i
o
n
 
C
a
m
p
s
 
a
n
d
 
G
e
n
d
e
r
 
D
i
f
f
e
r
e
n
c
e
 
i
n
 
V
a
c
c
i
n
a
t
i
o
n
2
2
.
5
3
3
.
5
4
4
.
5
5
Z
e
r
o
 
o
r
 
O
n
e
2
3
4
5
 
o
r
 
m
o
r
e
N
u
m
b
e
r
 
o
f
 
V
a
c
c
i
n
a
t
i
o
n
 
C
a
m
p
s
 
i
n
 
t
h
e
 
P
r
e
v
i
o
u
s
 
Y
e
a
r
A
v
e
r
a
g
e
 
T
o
t
a
l
 
V
a
c
c
i
n
a
t
i
o
n
s
 
0
0
.
0
5
0
.
1
0
.
1
5
0
.
2
0
.
2
5
0
.
3
0
.
3
5
0
.
4
0
.
4
5
0
.
5
A
v
e
r
a
g
e
 
T
o
t
a
l
 
V
a
c
c
i
n
a
t
i
o
n
s
 
f
o
r
 
B
o
y
s
 
M
i
n
u
s
 
A
v
e
r
a
g
e
 
T
o
t
a
l
 
V
a
c
c
i
n
a
t
i
o
n
s
 
f
o
r
 
G
i
r
l
s
M
a
l
e
 
A
v
e
.
F
e
m
a
l
e
 
A
v
e
.
D
i
f
f
e
r
e
n
c
e
N
o
t
e
s
:
 
T
h
i
s
 
f
i
g
u
r
e
 
r
e
p
o
r
t
s
 
d
i
f
f
e
r
e
n
c
e
s
 
i
n
 
t
o
t
a
l
 
n
u
m
b
e
r
 
o
f
 
v
a
c
c
i
n
a
t
i
o
n
s
 
b
y
 
g
e
n
d
e
r
 
a
n
d
 
t
h
e
 
a
v
e
r
a
g
e
 
n
u
m
b
e
r
 
o
f
 
v
a
c
c
i
n
a
t
i
o
n
s
 
g
r
a
p
h
e
d
 
a
g
a
i
n
s
t
 
t
h
e
 
r
e
p
o
r
t
e
d
 
n
u
m
b
e
r
 
o
f
 
v
a
c
c
i
n
a
t
i
o
n
 
c
a
m
p
s
 
i
n
 
t
h
e
 
p
r
e
v
i
o
u
s
 
y
e
a
r
.
 
 
T
h
e
 
d
a
t
a
 
i
s
 
f
r
o
m
 
t
h
e
 
N
a
t
i
o
n
a
l
 
F
a
m
i
l
y
 
a
n
d
 
H
e
a
l
t
h
 
S
u
r
v
e
y
 
1
9
9
8
-
1
9
9
9
.
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4
:
D
i
f
f
e
r
e
n
c
e
 
i
n
 
L
i
f
e
 
E
x
p
e
c
t
a
n
c
y
 
a
t
 
B
i
r
t
h
 
i
n
 
I
n
d
i
a
,
 
1
8
7
1
-
1
9
9
0
-
2
-
1
0
1
2
3
4
1
8
7
1
-
8
0
1
8
8
1
-
9
0
1
8
9
1
-
0
0
1
9
0
1
-
1
0
1
9
1
1
-
2
0
1
9
2
1
-
3
0
1
9
3
1
-
4
0
1
9
4
1
-
5
0
1
9
5
1
-
6
0
1
9
6
1
-
7
0
1
9
7
1
-
8
0
1
9
8
1
-
9
0
F
e
m
a
l
e
 
L
i
f
e
 
E
x
p
e
c
t
a
n
c
y
 
M
i
n
u
s
 
M
a
l
e
 
L
i
f
e
 
E
x
p
e
c
t
a
n
c
y
0
1
0
2
0
3
0
4
0
5
0
6
0
7
0
A
v
e
r
a
g
e
 
L
i
f
e
 
E
x
p
e
c
t
a
n
c
y
D
i
f
f
e
r
e
n
c
e
A
v
e
r
a
g
e
N
o
t
e
s
:
 
L
i
f
e
 
e
x
p
e
c
t
a
n
c
y
 
a
t
 
b
i
r
t
h
 
i
s
 
f
r
o
m
 
t
h
e
 
I
n
d
i
a
n
 
C
e
n
s
u
s
 
(
t
h
e
 
B
r
i
t
i
s
h
 
C
e
n
s
u
s
 
o
f
 
I
n
d
i
a
 
b
e
f
o
r
e
 
i
n
d
e
p
e
n
d
e
n
c
e
)
.
 
 
T
h
e
 
a
v
e
r
a
g
e
 
s
i
m
p
l
y
 
r
e
p
r
e
s
e
n
t
s
 
t
h
e
 
s
t
r
a
i
g
h
t
 
(
n
o
t
 
p
o
p
u
l
a
t
i
o
n
 
w
e
i
g
h
t
e
d
)
 
a
v
e
r
a
g
e
 
o
f
 
m
a
l
e
 
a
n
d
 
f
e
m
a
l
e
 
l
i
f
e
 
e
x
p
e
c
t
a
n
c
y
.
 
 
T
h
e
 
d
i
f
f
e
r
e
n
c
e
 
i
s
 
f
e
m
a
l
e
 
l
i
f
e
 
e
x
p
e
c
t
a
n
c
y
 
m
i
n
u
s
 
m
a
l
e
 
l
i
f
e
 
e
x
p
e
c
t
a
n
c
y
.
 
 
I
n
 
d
e
v
e
l
o
p
e
d
 
W
e
s
t
e
r
n
 
c
o
u
n
t
r
i
e
s
 
f
e
m
a
l
e
s
 
o
u
t
l
i
v
e
 
m
a
l
e
s
 
b
y
 
a
r
o
u
n
d
 
f
i
v
e
 
y
e
a
r
s
.
35